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Abstract 
The effects of employment protection legislation (EPL) on a country’s labor market are clear in theory 
but empirical evidence is only starting to catch up. In particular, EPL is not robust as an indicator of 
overall unemployment, but previous panel data analyses have shown it affects the flow of workers into 
and out of employment. Examining monthly and quarterly data from Armenia, I find that the country’s 
package of EPL has this same effect, and worker flows have slowed under the country’s new Labor Code. 
The paradox of where Armenia’s workforce is going still remains but can be hypothesized as entering the 
informal sector. 
JEL Classification: J63, P36 
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1. Introduction 
The question of the effect of employment protection legislation (EPL) on labor 
markets is a hotly debated one in both policy and economic circles. Broadly defined, 
EPL is designed, in the words of the World Bank, to “create conditions that are more 
conducive to job creation, protecting employment, and improving working conditions” 
(World Bank 2007a). In practice, this usually means a package of legislation that governs 
hiring and firing of workers, treatment of workers on the job (including holidays, sick 
leave, and maternity issues), and other related issues (such as workplace safety).2  
The creation of EPL often rests upon the assumption by economists and 
policymakers that legislation can be expertly designed in such a way as to improve the 
welfare of workers while not impacting the labor market in a negative manner (these 
assumptions mainly are based on a Coasean view of the world – that is, in a world of 
low transaction costs, negotiations can lead to redistribution without loss of efficiency).3 
In justifying the need for EPL, there usually is some reference to “market failure,” with 
legislation needed to protect workers from the depredations of employers in a situation 
of informational asymmetry. However, there are strong economic arguments against the 
adoption of EPL. Theoretically, interference in the labor market could increase costs to 
hiring and thus create or maintain unemployment, advantaging those who already have a 
job at the expense of those who are still looking. Additionally, EPL can focus on only a 
symptom of a weak economy (turnover) rather than underlying structural flaws that lead 
to these outcomes, and thus create even more distortions. 
                                                 
1 chartwell@ifc.org , International Finance Corporation 
2 Botero e. al (2003) separate EPL into three distinct areas: employment law, industrial and collective 
relations law, and social security law. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on employment law. 
3 See especially Freeman 2005 for an overview of proponents of this viewpoint. 
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A growing literature, typified by the OECD’s major initiatives over the past 4 
years (see, for example, Bassanini and Duval 2006), has attempted to quantify the effect 
of EPL on labor market performance, but has thus far yielded mixed results (more of 
this in Section II below). Much of this work has been done at the cross-country level, 
but has been restricted to developed economies, ostensibly to research differences in 
labor market performance connected with continuing stagnation in Europe, but also 
because labor market regulation data is much more prevalent in developed countries. A 
much more interesting case can be made for attempting to observe the effects of EPL 
in emerging and transition economies, however, as their labor markets are still 
developing; thus, changes in EPL could be expected to have larger effects than in a 
developed economy and can help our understanding of the transmission channels of 
labor market policy. This, in turn, can offer more accurate policy prescriptions for both 
transition and developed economies.  
Sadly, little is known about the effects of EPL on the labor market in emerging 
market economies, and even less about how EPL can change the market in a specific 
country over time. The purpose of this paper is to help redress this lack of knowledge 
by examining the effect of EPL in one particular transition economy: Armenia. The 
Armenian Labor Code, introduced in late 2004, is a modern piece of employment 
protection legislation that sets restrictions on hiring and firing and represents a 
comprehensive package of EPL unlike that which has ever existed in Armenia. This 
paper represents the first attempt to quantify the scale of the Code’s impact on the 
Armenian labor market; in particular, I will take a quantitative and econometric look at 
the effect of the Labor Code, based on performance in the job market in Armenia both 
before and after its inception. Through this analysis, I will seek to answer how recent 
employment protection legislation (EPL) affected the labor market in Armenia, and 
examine if previous results on the effects of EPL hold true in the Armenian case. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will provide a brief overview of 
literature dealing with EPL around the world, while Section 3 will examine the specific 
case of Armenia and the data available for analysis. Section 4 will describe the data and 
Section 5 the model, while Section 6 presents the results of the analysis. Section 7 offers 
some conclusions and avenues for further research.  
2. Literature Review: Theoretical Predictions and Empirical Results  
The effects of EPL on the labour market have been well-understood in the 
context of economic theory, both in terms of its influence on the stock of current 
workers and the flows of workers into and out of the system. From a theoretical 
standpoint, any legislation that a government enacts to restrict the flexibility of 
employers should have a negative influence on the flow of workers, raising the cost to 
hiring and firing and thus protecting the stock of current workers at the expense of the 
unemployed.4  
                                                 
4 Indeed, all EPL is in some way a distortion to market-determined forces: if private actors did not have 
these safeguards already, there must not have been a clear-cut demand for them, and if these safeguards 
did exist, government action would be redundant. However, other schools of economic thought would 
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In effect, this is a planned market distortion and exactly what EPL is designed to 
do; in pursuit of “stability” or “worker protection,” EPL by its nature seeks to reduce 
turnover in the labor market that already exists and make it more difficult for turnover 
to occur in the future. However, the cost for this reduced turnover would not only be 
felt in the reduced flow of workers, but the cost to society of longer unemployment 
spells (Blanchard and Portugal 2001). With less turnover, there will be less vacancies and 
thus those out of work would have to wait longer for a job. EPL also can decrease 
wages for those seeking to re-enter the workforce: with a longer wait for a job, any 
applicant would be willing to settle for a lower wage for work (Blanchard 1999 also 
shows that the cost of unemployment for those already employed would also increase, 
thus making current workers more willing to accept a lower wage than to confront the 
threat of extended unemployment).5  
Given these negatives, it would appear that EPL is, on an economic level, a policy 
to be avoided. Yet theorists have conjectured that on various levels (apart from 
turnover) that EPL can be beneficial, as “policies that try to restore equality of 
opportunity are warranted even in the absence of efficiency reasons” (Bassnini et. al 
2005, p. 10). In their study of workplace training in Europe, Bassanini et. al (2005) note 
that high workforce flexibility (i.e. high turnover) reduces the incentive to provide skills 
and knowledge to workers, and thus EPL, by keeping workers employed longer, would 
also increase investment in human capital on those workers that were employed. From a 
social/political standpoint as well, EPL reduces the risk of a particular employee being 
laid-off, reducing political tensions that can arise from job insecurity. Moreover, well-
designed supporting or secondary institutions in the labor market (Abraham and 
Houseman 1994) can mitigate from the employers’ side some of the rigidity imposed by 
EPL, thus finding alternatives to layoffs that also improve employer adjustment to 
changing market conditions. Finally, as Addison and Teixeira (2001, p. 3) note in their 
overview of the theory surrounding EPL, “employment protection legislation can 
enhance productivity performance by encouraging worker cooperation in the 
development of the production process, stimulate training investments, and reduce 
‘excessive’ turnover” at the aggregate level. These effects are based mainly on the 
supposition of labor market imperfections, such as asymmetric information and/or 
misaligned incentives, which can be mitigated by appropriate legislation. 
The myriad types of EPL and how they are implemented are also presumed on a 
theoretical level to influence different segments of the labor market in different ways 
(see Table 1); for example, government-mandated maternity leave can be expected to 
increase the relative cost of hiring women, thus altering an employer’s incentives 
towards hiring males instead. These effects can be mitigated in a Coasean world (see 
Lazear 1990) through flexible institutions that enable bargaining to distribute cost; for 
example, restrictions on firing workers could be alleviated for employers by having 
                                                                                                                                      
imply that the absence of employment protection is a “market failure” that needs to be redressed via 
governmental action, which is the most common argument politically for the institution of EPL. 
5 Little work has been done empirically on the wage effect of EPL, mainly due to the difficulty of 
obtaining data. The only notable research done on individual-level data to this point has been Leonardi 
and Pica 2007, who examined EPL effects on workers in Italy and found that entry wages were 
unaffected but wages during the first and second year (i.e. when a worker is most likely to be fired) 
decreased by 20% and 8% respectively. 
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employees pay a sum equal to the net present value of the firing cost upon their hiring. 
However, in the real world, and especially in a world that imposes EPL, this kind of 
flexibility is usually lacking and the distortions that EPL impose can remain. 
While a large literature has coalesced around both the theoretical effects of EPL 
on labor markets, unfortunately there is little agreement on their effects empirically, with 
many studies finding no effect of EPL on broader employment trends, with others 
showing effects only in specific employment indicators. While the most sweeping study 
done by Botero et. al (2003) finds, consistent with the theoretical framework noted 
above, that “heavier regulation of labor is associated with a larger unofficial economy, 
lower labor force participation, and higher unemployment, especially of the young,”6 the 
record of other research is mixed. Indeed, most cross-country studies finding that EPL 
does not have a significant effect on labor markets in terms of aggregate employment or 
unemployment (see Micco and Pages 2007 for a brief review). For example, an early 
attempt by the OECD (1999) to estimate EPL effects over 1985-97, using two-period 
panel regressions, finds that in almost all cases that EPL has a negative but insignificant 
effect on employment (with the only significant effect on the sub-group of “prime 
[working]-age men”). Similarly, Heckman and Pages (2000) use a sample of OECD and 
Latin American countries but find little significance across their specifications for EPL 
and unemployment. 
The reason for the divergence between theory and evidence has also been a bone 
of contention for economists, with several ideas mooted, including that there are 
country-specific effects not captured in the panel data, or, more likely, omitted variable 
bias distorts the effect of EPL. Additionally, indicators of EPL can be misspecified, as 
they have been mostly utilized in cross-country regressions as an index or score (as in 
the OECD’s 18 point EPL scale, see OECD 1999). However, a more simple 
explanation may exist for the lack of correlation, in that labor policy changes tend not to 
occur very often, and thus simply examining stocks of workers at any one time would 
do little to show a reaction to a long-standing policy. It would be more effective to find 
data and specifications that actually comport with the theory noted above: that EPL is 
designed to reduce turnover, and thus examining job flows, rather than unemployment 
stocks, are the only way to see the effect of EPL.  
Work done in this arena has, for the most part, found more robust correlations 
between EPL and reduced job flows, confirming much of the theory on how EPL can 
restrain a job market. In the seminal paper in this area, Blanchard and Portugal (2001), 
the authors compared Portugal, with one of the strictest EPL frameworks in the world, 
with the US, which has one of most flexible, to ascertain why unemployment rates of 
the two countries were similar over 1983 to 1998. While coming to the same conclusion 
of EPL and its effects on aggregate unemployment, their analysis of Portuguese data 
showed that EPL reduced job flows, reducing unemployment, but increased 
unemployment duration which in turn increased the unemployment rate. The 
                                                 
6 This would be prima facie evidence of the overriding influence of transaction costs as well, with the 
impact on efficiency unable to be negotiated away. 
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concurrence of these two effects would be a wash on overall unemployment, but taken 
individually they show how the labor market is adversely affected by EPL.7  
This result has been replicated by several researchers, with one of the most 
persuasive arguments for examining job flows coming from Wolfers 2005, who noted 
that the vast majority of cross-country studies utilize annual data, which in and of itself 
smoothes out monthly, seasonal, and quarterly patterns of employment. In order to 
avoid this aggregating effect, he argues that “employment protection does not 
significantly alter a firm’s response to highly persistent shocks – such as those present in 
annual data” and rather it is transitory shocks, such as seasonal changes, that can show 
the effect of EPL; this can only be seen in quarterly or monthly data, as shown in 
Barsky and Miron (1989). Using quarterly OECD data, disaggregated by industry, 
Wolfers concludes that job flows are significantly and negatively affected by 
employment protection. Other work at the industry level has confirmed these results, 
showing that combining the lower-turnover effects with prolonged unemployment leads 
to negative effects for any labor market, but one that may not be captured by broader 
unemployment figures.8 
Beyond these methodological issues, empirical analysis of EPL could also be 
suffering from a misinterpretation of cause-and-effect, a misinterpretation caused by 
focusing on mainly industrialized nations. In reality, most countries that originally 
enacted EPL were countries that already had high per-capita incomes and had more 
resilient labor markets and institutions that were already on their way to providing some 
form of EPL. To assume that EPL in these countries was given exogenously, rather 
than occurring as a function of the country’s already-existing institutions and growth 
trends, is thus an error in sequencing and ignores the role of prior institutions in 
creating new policy and administration. If EPL is instead endogenous, we could expect 
that legislation that comes out of existing institutions and past performance would have 
less of an effect than a more radical break with the past, and would be more incremental 
than EPL that is imposed on a fledgling market. This hypothesis is also consistent with 
Botero et. al (2003), which finds that richer countries tend to regulate labor less than 
poorer countries, perhaps as a result of their higher incomes and mature labor market 
institutions, and perhaps as a result of previous experience with labor regulation. 
If this hypothesis is indeed true, we should expect to find the impact of EPL to be 
much more significant in transition economies, where market institutions and 
frameworks are weak, and where the imposition of Western-style EPL can cause a 
major distortion in the labor market. As noted in the introduction, rigorous empirical 
work on transition economies has been lacking, and only starting to come on-line in the 
past few years. Cazes and Nesporova (2003) have attempted the broadest and most 
sweeping analysis of EPL in transition economies, analyzing labor market changes and 
EPL in Central and Eastern European transition countries, the Baltic States, and the 
Russian Federation. Their findings suggested that EPL had only a minor impact on 
                                                 
7 Similarly, Hoek 2002, examining regulated and unregulated labor markets in Brazil, found that changes 
in unemployment in the formal sector, subject to strict EPL, were more persistent and less cyclical than 
in the informal sector (where EPL did not apply); thus, flows (if not stocks) were impacted by the use of 
EPL. 
8 See for example Kugler and Pica 2007, an excellent look at Italian industry-level data that concludes that 
1990 EPL reform in Italy reduced entry rates and employment adjustments. 
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these transition countries, a result that may have been tempered by the fact that they 
appeared to analyze only the advanced transition economies (leading to confusion of 
causation and correlation). Other work in this area has found somewhat stronger 
correlation between EPL and unemployment in transition economies (Haltiwanger et. al 
2003), while modeling exercises undertaken by the IMF have shown this same 
correlation for countries outside of the former socialist sphere (Koranchelian and 
Fanizza 2005). It is in this vein that I propose to examine the effects of EPL in 
Armenia. 
3. EPL, the Labor Code, and Armenia 
Armenia has a labor market that is typical of post-Soviet countries early in their 
structural (as opposed to macroeconomic) transition, with high informality and hidden 
unemployment that is not captured by official figures. While the country has shown 
impressive macroeconomic gains, posting GDP growth on average of 12% over the 
past 8 years (leading the World Bank to perhaps over-optimistically dub the country a 
“Caucasian Tiger”), these gains have not been distributed through the labor market nor 
the country (most of the growth is centered on the capital, Yerevan). Indeed, the largest 
problem that Armenia has seen since independence is a steady “brain drain,” with 
migration from the country spreading the Armenian Diaspora far and wide. This in turn 
has led to a large flow of remittances to the country (see Roberts 2004). 
Labor relations and employment in Armenia are governed by the Labor Code, 
enacted in November 2004 as part of a broader effort to unify labor legislation and 
replace many of the Soviet-era codes that were still governing employer-employee 
relations at the time (in practice during the 1990s, Armenia followed and enforced the 
1972 Labor Code of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, even though it technically 
had no force of law). Labor legislation since the fall of the Soviet Union moved slowly 
and in a desultory manner (as the labor market was not a priority for successive 
Armenian governments), and was reactive to both international donors and the desire 
for EU accession, with only two major pieces of legislation enacted in this sphere: the 
Law on Employment Promotion (1996) and the Law on Work Remuneration (2001).  
The Labor Code of 2004 was created (with World Bank assistance) to fill this gap, 
consolidating some of the legislation that had been passed and dramatically expanding 
worker protections to 24 chapters and 266 articles covering employment contracts, 
conditions for hiring and firing, work hours, paid and unpaid leave, maternity leave, and 
collective bargaining.9 As the World Bank mentioned in its project completion 
document, the new Code was designed to reduce some of the onerous conditions that 
existed in the previous socialist code, and was designed to “reinforce the principles of 
freedom of association and collective bargaining, clarify and simplify the basic 
conditions for employment contracts, reduce minimum annual leave entitlements, 
remove existing declaratory privileges to particular groups of employees, and impose 
                                                 
9 Wages were not included in the Labor Code explicitly, apart from Chapter 19 where it is noted that 
minimum wages will be set by the government. As part of the general move towards labor regulation, a 
Minimum Wage Act was also passed in 2004, setting the minimum wage at 13,000 Armenian drams. It 
has since been revised upwards to 15,000AMD in 2006, 20,000AMD in 2007 and 25,000AMD in 2008 
to remain at approximately $50US/month. 
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labor dispute resolution” (World Bank 2004, p. 14). The World Bank’s “Doing 
Business” methodology showed that the bulk of the changes in the Labor Code were 
concentrated in the ability of employers to terminate contracts, making it much easier 
than previously (the Soviet-era code made it a near-impossibility, and earlier legislation 
had preserved this “right to work”).10 At the same time, the Labor Code’s differences 
with the socialist code actually made it almost twice as difficult to hire workers (Table 
2), as the Code limited fixed-term contracts to a length of 5 years, prohibited the use of 
fixed-term contracts for “permanent” tasks (Kuddo 2009), and created “the institution 
of so-called ‘temporary work agency’ [which was] not defined in either the old or the 
new legislation” (World Bank 2007a, p. 112). 
While the Labor Code moved towards a more recognizable piece of “western” 
employment legislation, there is still some debate on whether the Labor Code actually 
achieved its goal as stated by the World Bank as being overall less restrictive than the 
previous legislation. The World Bank, in a 2007 survey of the Armenian labor market, 
utilized OECD methodology to rate the previous EPL in the country as somewhat 
restrictive, reaching 3.2 on a 6 point scale and surpassed only by Portugal, Mexico, and 
Turkey (World Bank 2007a). Using this same ranking system, the World Bank estimated 
that the new Labor Code enacted in November 2004 was actually less restrictive, at a 
level of 2.2 (similar to the labor laws of Austria and the Netherlands). The Fraser 
Institute’s “Economic Freedom of the World” Index also has a similar, if more 
marginal, movement, with the component of “labor market regulations” improving 
from a rating of 5.22 in 2004 to 5.56 in 2005 (Gwartney et. al 2009).11 
Despite these two indicators of improvement in Armenia’s labor legislation, 
evidence has mounted that the Labor Code, especially in its enforcement, is more 
restrictive, not less, than the system that existed previously. A tell-tale sign comes from 
the Fraser Institute ranking just cited: while the overall ranking improved after the 
institution of the Labor Code, one of the sub-components of the “labor market 
regulations” index, hiring and firing regulations, dropped precipitously from a 6.5 to a 
5.1. Additionally, the World Bank’s Doing Business indicators also has shown 
differential effects of the Code, showing with more precision which areas have become 
more flexible and which have not: 
The rigidity of employment index declined from 36 to 31 and firing costs declined from 17 
weeks to 13 weeks. The increased flexibility was largely due to the relaxation of restrictions on 
firing staff (with difficulty to fire reduced from 50 to 20), whereas rigidity of hours remained 
unchanged at 40 and difficulty of hiring deteriorated from 17 to 33. The latter was mainly due 
to the Labour Code prohibition on fixed term contracts for permanent jobs. (European 
Training Foundation 2010, p.70). 
Survey evidence of Armenian firms, as well, has shown that many employers feel 
there are still significant problems with the Code, including worries that it has unclear or 
                                                 
10 One of the socialist relics that was preserved in the Labor Code was the “work book,” required to be 
kept by employers for all their employees. It functions as an internal passport for the labor market, and 
it is a violation to not be in possession of one’s work book. 
11 The Fraser Institute ratings systems for its index of economic freedom runs from 0 to 10, 10 being the 
highest. For labor regulations, this component includes rankings for minimum wage, hiring and firing 
regulations, centralized collective bargaining, mandated cost of hiring, mandated cost of worker 
dismissal, and conscription. 
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contradictory on several provisions and a belief that it tends to regulate areas that are 
best left to the market (as in the case of overtime – see VGM Partners 2008). The 
World Bank’s own Enterprise Survey in Armenia, taken in 2002, 2005, and 2009 has 
shown a definite increase in employers who noted that labor market regulations were an 
obstacle, rising from 0.93% of firms in 2002 to 3.37% in 2005 (the first year of the 
Labor Code) and 7.59% in 2009. More significantly, especially when compared to other 
CIS countries, Armenian firms noted in the 2005 World Bank/EBRD Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) that they would increase 
their existing workforce by an average of 16% if they “didn’t have any [formal] 
restrictions (i.e. didn’t have to seek permission, make severance payments, etc.)” (World 
Bank 2005).  
The discrepancy between the perception on the ground and from above on the 
effects of the Labor Code may be traced back to an issue that has plagued all CIS 
countries (and indeed, all developing countries): implementation. From a legal 
standpoint, the new Labor Code appears to be a vast improvement over the Soviet-era 
Labor Code, which was tilted heavily in favor of worker protection as part of the 
“worker’s paradise.” However, during the 1990s, while the old Soviet Code was in 
theory still in effect, in reality, no labor regulations prevailed on a consistent basis. More 
importantly, the creation of governmental labor market institutions for oversight that 
are seen in advanced economies, such as Labor Ministries, employment agencies, and a 
Labor Inspectorate, were overlooked in favor of other transition priorities. In this 
environment, any move towards a different legal structure that was to be implemented, 
no matter how much better it looked on paper, was bound to be restrictive, for the 
simple fact that it actually was being enforced.12  
This shift from general laissez-faire labor enforcement in Armenia to more state 
oversight has created its own effects in the labor market: as New Institutional 
Economics (NIE), especially as applied to transition economies (North 1997), has 
demonstrated, formal institutional development can influence growth patterns in a 
country by influencing incentives and transaction costs that developed in the absence of 
these institutions. Given this disjointed transition in legal and administrative regimes, we 
can expect that the institution of a new Labor Code and its accompanying governmental 
entities would have profound effects on the still-nascent labor market in the country. 
Ascertaining these effects is the subject of the next two sections.  
                                                 
12 In this sense, Armenia’s labor market is undergoing another transition as the Government is attempting 
to create formal labor institutions to enforce the Labor Code at the same time that it has created a new 
legal framework for the market. This has included the development of a State Labor Inspectorate (hived 
off of other ministries and agencies in 2005) to conduct inspections and a State Employment Services 
Agency (SESA) to oversee unemployment registration and job matching services. As is often the case 
with new institutions with an unfamiliar mandate, these agencies are currently lacking capacity and are 
undergoing “growing pains;” in particular, the Labor Inspectorate is seen by businesses only as a way 
for the government to collect revenue, while SESA is perceived more as a provider of passive labor 
measures (unemployment payments) than active measures (job re-training) – see VGM Partners 2008. 
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4. The Data 
In order to ascertain the effect of the Labor Code and Armenia’s new formal 
labor institutions, I have amassed a dataset giving an accurate picture of the labor 
market both before and after the inception of the Code in November 2004. As in all 
transition economies, however, there are problems with data in the labor market, and 
these problems loom especially large in the Armenian context. Of first concern is the 
fact that unofficial estimates of unemployment in Armenia diverge wildly from official 
estimates: for example, the official unemployment rate in 2005 was 8.1%, while the 
Labor Force Survey conducted by the according to the National Statistical Service (NSS) 
put actual unemployment at 31.3%. The underreporting of unemployment is due to the 
Armenian government’s definition of “unemployed”: a person is only counted as 
“unemployed” if he or she has registered with the State Employment Services Agency 
(SESA).13  
In addition to these issues in ascertaining unemployment, there is also a large bias 
in employment data given the prevalence of the informal economy in Armenia. Unlike 
countries such as Brazil, which have a long series of household and labor surveys that 
can give hard data on the size of the informal labor force (Hoek 2002), Armenia has 
intermittent labor market surveys that occur only in the presence of donor funding. The 
latest survey in 2007 was conducted by the NSS of a sample of 520 businesses, of which 
181 were located in Yerevan, and the remaining 339 in the regions (marzes), with a 
further 1,200 people classified as “vulnerable” surveyed for the supply side of the 
market. Given the lack of funding for longitudinal studies in Armenia, it is very difficult 
to track labor market changes over time, and the relatively small scale of the latest labor 
market survey also provides problems for assessing broader trends in the country (a tour 
of problems in estimating the informal economy in former Soviet countries is shown in 
Khomenko 2007).  
A final problem, common to all transition economies, is the paucity of 
observations across all variables. While I have tried to obtain monthly data to isolate 
labor market effects, there still is a short time series for Armenia, even shorter when one 
considers that the Labor Code is less than four years old (also when one considers 
monthly data series are recorded by the NSS only from 2000 onward). Future research, 
working with a longer time-series, will better show the effects that the Code has had on 
the Armenian labor market, but it is our hope that we can begin to see the influence of 
the laws and their implementation on Armenia after this short period of time. 
With these caveats in mind, I have created a database of employment, 
macroeconomic, and institutional indicators from either 2000-2008 or 2000-2010 (where 
available). Following the lead of Wolfers 2005, I have, where possible, tried to obtain 
quarterly or monthly data to overcome the lack of observations, and also to ascertain 
seasonal job flows. Much of the data comes from the NSS, with data on job vacancies 
taken from the State Employment Services Agency (SESA). Additional pieces were 
filled in as necessary from the World Bank, the IMF, and the EBRD, with pre-2004 
migration statistics taken from Robert and Banaian (2005) and later data taken from the 
                                                 
13 Another issue contributing to undercounting of unemployment is the fact that a land owner in Armenia 
cannot be classified as unemployed. Any land owner is thus counted as “working” in agriculture, 
without any thought of whether or not the land is arable. 
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Ministry for Territorial Administration. While the data issues noted above may have a 
major impact on the actual estimates of EPL effects, I feel that they will nonetheless 
capture the correct magnitude of changes, if even on a smaller scale.  
5. Empirical Model 
Unlike earlier work that has focused on broader EPL, including social security 
laws and the effects of collective bargaining and unions (Botero et. al 2003), I will 
remain focused in this paper on employment law, including employment contracts and 
job security. This is mainly due to the lack of unionization in Armenia14, the lack of 
strikes in the country15, and a still-incipient approach to collective bargaining.16 Similarly, 
the social security system in Armenia is currently in a massive state of flux, as 
consideration of a move to a three-pillar system is underway and likely to be 
implemented over the coming years; thus, expectations of this change may shape 
current behavior, while previous job-market effects are likely to be minimal.  
Following from the Bassanini and Duval (2006), our empirical model of the labor 
market in Armenia takes into account the effect of both EPL and 
macroeconomic/institutional controls to examine the performance of employment in 
the country from 2000 (annual data is available in some cases back to 1992, but monthly 
and quarterly data is only available to 2000) up to the latest available data in 2010. The 
model actually takes three separate forms, in order to minimize possible issues with both 
the data and the reality of a transition economy. In the first instance, the baseline 
equation for our analysis is: 
 
Yt = αXt + χLCt + γt + εt        (1) 
 
Under equation (1), Y represents a series of labor market outcomes (described 
below), dependent on a vector of macroeconomic controls (X), the Labor Code (LC), 
time (t), and an Armenia-specific error term. The most important portion of this 
equation for measuring EPL in Armenia is the Labor Code term (LC). As EPL 
legislation was changed as part of a broad package in 2004, it makes little sense to do as 
thorough a ranking as the OECD’s 18 point scale on different facets of employment 
protection (the World Bank (2007a) already has undertaken such an exercise, as noted 
above). A dummy instead was used beginning at November 2004 (for monthly data) or 
Q4 2004 (for quarterly data) to demarcate the pre- and post-Labor Code era, taking 1 
                                                 
14 The collapse of the Soviet Union also saw the collapse of trade unions in Armenia. Currently, there are 
only a few unions that operate in the country, with the two largest umbrella organizations the 
Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU) and the Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen (Employers) 
of Armenia. The CTU claim to have 43% of the labor force in Armenia as members, but is widely seen 
as ineffective and non-representative.  
15 According to official records, there has not been a strike in the country since the passage of the Labor 
Code, even though there is a somewhat confusing procedure allowed in the legislation for strikes. 
16 While the principle of collective bargaining is recognized in the Labor Code, at present, there are no 
real mechanisms for conducting such negotiations at the national level.  
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for months or quarters in which the Labor Code was in force. This approach follows 
other research which has examined turning points for EPL that are based on time 
variables (see especially Leonardi and Pica 2007). 
Additionally under equation (1), the X term represents a series of control variables 
that can explain our labor market outcomes. Per earlier literature, these control variables 
include: 
Output gap: Following several prior studies, including Elmeskov, Martin and 
Scarpetta (1998), Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2004), and Bassanini and Duval (2006), I have 
calculated an “output gap” on GDP data via a Hodrick-Prescott filter. This variable 
shows the gap between actual and potential output as a percentage of potential output. 
While an “output gap” is a dangerous concept, relying on neoclassical ideas of 
perfectibility and Pareto optimality, in a short time span it can make sense as an 
indicator of deviation; in this sense, the output gap will measure Armenia’s deviation 
from its prior path of GDP growth rather than deviation from an “optimal” end-point. 
Tax wedge: As used by the World Bank, the tax wedge on labor calculates the ratio 
of “social” taxes (including the worker’s “contribution” to the pension fund, the 
employer’s “contribution” to the pension fund, and the personal income tax rate) to the 
total cost of labor to an employer (defined as total wages plus the employer’s tax for the 
pension fund). While the Bank itself has calculated a tax wedge in Armenia (see 
especially World Bank 2007a and 2005), they used nominal rates as stipulated in the 
relevant legislation in Armenia. By contrast, our variable calculates an effective rate of 
taxation using both the nominal rates and the different brackets for employers, tracked 
against an employee making 100% of the Average Production Wage (APW - data taken 
monthly from the NSS).  
Time: While time may heal all wounds, it is not necessarily true that time affects all 
labor market outcomes. To guard against the eventuality that some things in Armenia 
are really just getting better on their own, whether through learning effects, knowledge 
dissemination, or the like, time is included to capture these effects. It is also crucial to 
include time as a variable distinct from the Labor Code dummy, in order to separate 
broader time trends from the ones that can be tied to the introduction of EPL. 
Average amount of benefits received: Taken from NSS data, this variable gives the 
monthly average benefit received by an unemployed person in the country. This is also 
used as a dependent variable, in order to ascertain the determinants of benefits offered 
and see if the Labor Code has increased or decreased the government’s largess. 
The dependent variables in our analysis include:  
Total number of unemployed: This is the official number of unemployed per NSS 
numbers (with all the problems expressed above), in thousands. 
Unemployed males: The total number of males registered as unemployed per month. 
Unemployed females: The same, but for females. Both variables are taken from NSS 
data. 
Seasonal Employment Flows: The absolute value of the difference in the number of 
people registered as “employed” in one month over the corresponding month of the 
previous year (given the obvious seasonality in the data, the seasonal component has 
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been removed). The interest in this variable is not so much in the direction of the flows 
but rather their variability over time. 
Difference in vacancies advertised (beginning of period): SESA also advertises job vacancies 
as part of passive labor market measures, and records their monthly vacancies at both 
the beginning and end of the month. This variable is the change in vacancies year over 
year, from the beginning of the period. 
Difference in vacancies between beginning of period and end of period: This variable explores 
the change between the beginning of month vacancies and those remaining at the end 
of the month. It is used as a proxy for efficiency of job matching in Armenia. 
Seasonal Unemployment Flows: Similar to employment flows calculated above, 
unemployment flows show the actual trend in unemployment registration compared to 
the corresponding quarter of the previous year. Here, unlike in employment flows, it is 
more important to see where the direction of change, to measure if people are either 
swelling or shrinking the roster of the unemployed. 
Monthly migration statistics: From the Ministry for Territorial Administration, these 
figures show the monthly balance of migration to/from Armenia using air, land, and rail 
links. 
These indicators were used in several variants of Equation 1; the results are 
detailed in the next section. 
Equation 1 is a standard OLS regression on time-series data, but it may not be 
sufficient to deal with problems inherent in the data. In the first instance, a glance at 
much of the literature on EPL deals with pooled and cross-country analysis, and thus 
must utilize both random and fixed-effects regressions in order to deal with country- 
and time-specific effects. Our specification does not have the issue of cross-section-
specific effects, but is very likely to suffer from omitted variable bias (as shown in 
Equation 1a), which may be unavoidable due to the lack of effective data in Armenia for 
other variables other than those assembled here.  
 
Yt = αXt + χLCt + γt +Ai+ εt        (1a) 
 
It is possible that Equation 1a is the true specification of the model, with A being 
the unobserved variable that is influencing labor market outcomes in Armenia while also 
being correlated with macroeconomic variables or the Labor Code’s effects. Rather than 
attempting to over-correct for the omitted variables (magnifying the original problem 
with further misspecification, as noted by Clarke 2005), I will utilize a first-differences 
equation, where the data is differenced according to the previous period (as in Tu 2010): 
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The use of Equations 2 is a standard fixed-effects specification that will drop out 
unobserved time-invariant variables (A in equation 1a) that are Armenia-specific, 
without unduly restricting degrees of freedom or vitiating the dataset. Equation 2 will 
also help to cross-check the robustness of results specified in Equation 1, as well as 
correct the reality that there will be unobserved variables at play in our observation of 
the effects of the Labor Code. 
6. Results 
6.1 OLS Regressions 
The simplest OLS regression(s) along the lines of Equation 1 measures official 
total monthly unemployment numbers from 2000-2010 as a function of variables which 
can be reasonably expected to influence employment trends: in this case, the Labor 
Code, time, the output gap, the tax wedge, and a constant. Sensitivity analysis for this 
regression shows some interesting results (Table 3), as total unemployment appears to 
be negatively correlated with the Labor Code in all of the four regressions, with the 
smallest significance in the final equation including the tax wedge. Behavior in the other 
variables is mostly as expected, as a higher tax wedge increases unemployment by a large 
and very significant amount, while the output gap has a significant but barely noticeable 
(in terms of magnitude) effect on unemployment. Time also has an effect, although its 
direction changes depending upon the other included variables, with only the regression 
including the output gap alone showing unemployment increasing over time; otherwise, 
as expected, unemployment on average has decreased over time.. The high adjusted R2 
of this last regression (0.97) shows that the model is indeed a good fit (subject to 
omitted variables, which will be explored below), allowing us to tentatively conclude 
that the Labor Code has worked as designed and lowered the total number of 
unemployed in Armenia. 
Going beneath the total stock of unemployment, however, also yields interesting 
results. Disaggregating the stock of unemployed into males and females, we see that the 
Labor Code has had its primary effect on females in the workplace in Armenia. As 
Table 4 shows, the effect of the Labor Code on males is entirely insignificant, but the 
number of unemployed females (Table 5) has dropped during the years in which the 
Labor Code has been in force, in addition to the time trend. The explanation for this 
can follow quite logically from the purpose of EPL, which is to restrict job turnover: 
women are most likely to have greater turnover in Armenia (indeed, women are 
unemployed in the country at a ratio of between 2.5 – 3.0 to 1 as men), due to the 
emphasis of the culture on the family and the generally low-skill nature of jobs that 
women occupy in the country. However, a facet of the Labor Code not heretofore 
noted is that, while it increased the ease of firing workers, it also dramatically expanded 
maternity provisions and codified times that mothers may take off and when they could 
and could not be terminated. In this sense, the EPL legislation that is the Labor Code 
made it more difficult to fire women, perhaps enabling them to keep their jobs when in 
earlier times they would have been terminated if they became pregnant. Another, equally 
plausible explanation for this result is that, given the increase in difficulty in hiring 
workers that the Labor Code imposed, more women entered the informal than formal 
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sector, thus showing a drop in unemployment as women dropped out of the 
workforce.17  
Keeping in line with our analysis above, and following in the footsteps of Wolfers, 
it is more interesting to examine the flow of workers into and out of employment and 
the formal labor market, in order to ascertain EPL effects as they are designed. 
Armenia’s labor market has been shrinking ever since independence, with migration and 
demographic trends combining to shrink the amount of the economically active 
population. This trend has passed through to the number of employed in the country, 
which has remained stagnant around the 1.1 million mark from 2004 onward. A first 
analysis on employment flows will utilize the total amount of employed in the country 
over seasons to measure flows in and out of the workplace, subject to data limitations 
and problems in the series.18 Within Armenia’s overall decline in the active population 
and lack of change in the number of employed, Table 6a shows that the Labor Code has 
had a positive and significant effect on the absolute value of labor flows in and out of 
seasonal employment, meaning that the Labor Code contributed to increased turnover 
in the Armenian labor market. However, analyzing the direction of the flows shows that 
it was almost entirely one-way, with people exiting the labor force instead of entering it 
(Table 6b, with Labor Code dummy just barely insignificant at the 10% level). This 
comports well with the World Bank’s assertion that the Labor Code increased the ease 
of firing in Armenia while increased the burden on hiring!  
Another indicator of employment flows is the number of vacancies advertised 
with SESA, which keeps monthly records of jobs advertised both at the beginning and 
end of the month. The raw data shows that the absolute number of vacancies from 
SESA has held fairly steady over the past decade, from a low of just over 500 in the 
agency’s early years to a high of 1,580 in November 2006 before settling down closer to 
the mean of just over a thousand a month. A quick analysis of the change in vacancies 
year on year from 2000-2008 (latest data available), however, shows that vacancies have 
been growing with a slightly faster and slightly significant pace in Labor Code years 
(Table 7). Does this mean that there are more people being hired in the face of EPL 
legislation? In order to test this effect, it appears that the change in vacancies over the 
month would presumably reflect jobs that were filled and removed, while those that 
remained at the end of the month were not (the difference between the two numbers 
acting as a metric for job-matching efficiency in Armenia). Observing the difference in 
                                                 
17 Unfortunately, the lack of disaggregation of statistics on the economically active workforce makes this 
hypothesis, for the moment, untestable. 
18 The analysis on seasonal employment flows contains years from 2000-02, 2004-2007, and 2009-10, with 
the years 2003 and 2008 omitted. The reason for this is that 2003 data from the National Statistical 
Service (NSS) of Armenia represents a severe series break; as part of routine maintenance and updating 
of statistics, the NSS revised its data in 2003 to take into account findings from the 2001 Census, which 
dramatically lowered the estimates of “employed persons” in the country. As the employment flow 
indicator is a measure of change of total employment, to include 2003 would have introduced a much 
larger than actual drop in employment a mere year before the Labor Code was introduced (but that 
would have only been a statistical, rather than actual, effect). Similarly, 2008 shows a similar structural 
break with a large employment spike that cannot, at yet, be explained (see Figure 1). Due to the 
statistical difficulties with this series, the results on aggregate employment flows should be taken with a 
grain of salt.  
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vacancies tells a different story than our first supposition, that increased vacancies 
means there is increased employment flows under the Labor Code (Table 8): while the 
absolute number of vacancies may be increasing, the difference between the beginning 
and the end of the month has been decreasing during the period the Labor Code has 
been in existence, meaning that fewer jobs are being filled.19 Once again, this supports 
the belief that the Labor Code has made it easier to fire but more difficult to hire 
workers in Armenia. 
The flip side of employment flows is of course changes in unemployment (rather 
than just the stock, as examined earlier). Here, too, interesting pattern emerges as a 
result of the Labor Code. The total number of unemployed in Armenia has steadily 
decreased every quarter since 2000, but the rate of people leaving the unemployment 
rolls has markedly slowed since the Labor Code was passed in 2004 (indeed, as Figure 2 
shows for quarter over quarter turnover, the unemployment rolls actually expanded in 
Q1 2006 and Q1 2007, as well as in 2008 due to global financial crisis). Table 9 shows 
the results of an equation using seasonal unemployment flows as the variable, with the 
added variable of average benefits paid to the unemployed (on the theory that larger 
benefits would stop people at the margins from entering the workforce). The results are 
in line with theory: as the Labor Code was put into law, the drop in the unemployment 
rolls slowed significantly, independent of benefits offered (indeed, the amount of 
benefits paid remains insignificant as an explanatory variable, even though benefits 
appear to have increased significantly during the Labor Code period, even when 
controlling for average wages and the number of unemployed – see Table 10). Put 
together with the stagnation in employment turnover seasonally, it appears that workers 
in Armenia may be keeping their jobs, but those who are on the outside are not moving 
into the workforce. This effect is exactly what is predicted by EPL theory, that EPL will 
benefit those who already have a job at the expense of those that are out of work.  
This result overlooks a crucial fact, however, and this is, for the most part and 
noting the exceptions already mentioned, that unemployment rolls continue to decline 
in Armenia (see Figure 3). As noted above, it would appear that the people climbing out 
of unemployment do not seem to be climbing into jobs, as there is no corresponding 
sustained growth on the employment side to the continual drop in unemployment 
(Figure 3 shows a slight tick upward in employment since 2004, but high variability over 
seasons and years). Thus, with employment turnover seemingly going on one direction 
(more firings, less hiring), less people entering the workforce, and less people filling 
vacancies advertised, but in the presence of continuously declining unemployment, one 
can only surmise one of two plausible explanations: people are leaving the workforce for 
the informal sector, or they are leaving the country entirely. 
A case can be made for both of these hypotheses given Armenia’s recent history. 
Migration from the country is substantial, with the population of the country decreasing 
steadily over the period of independence, with a large drain during the immediate post-
independence years and during the war with Azerbaijan. However, much of the “brain 
drain” observed in Armenia appeared to have occurred already, and during some of the 
                                                 
19 This result is somewhat paradoxical, for it shows that employer demand is growing, albeit at a slow 
pace, but that the suppliers of labor are not taking the positions. This can show either a mismatch in the 
labor force in Armenia (a high probability), but can also suggest the issue of increased informality, 
which will be explored more below. 
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Labor Code years, there was actually a mild inflow of Armenians into the country. An 
analysis of the Labor Code’s effect on migration statistics (obtained from the Ministry 
for Territorial Administration) shows a negative correlation between migration and 
EPL, but it is almost wholly statistically insignificant (see Table 11). This insignificance 
continues to hold for quarterly and monthly data, for migration flows, and controlling 
different seasons (controlling for seasons makes the Labor Code dummy entirely 
insignificant, while spring has a significant negative effect on migration). 
Given this lack of evidence in migration, where is Armenia’s workforce going? It 
is our hypothesis that the Labor Code has contributed to workers leaving (or being fired 
from) their jobs, but the drop in flows into unemployment, combined with the lack of 
jobs being filled, suggest that the unemployed are going into the informal sector, due 
mainly to the new difficulties imposed by EPL, rather than entering new positions in the 
formal economy. Of course, measuring the informal economy is a difficult task, and 
when it is done, it tends to occur on an annual, rather than monthly or seasonal, basis. 
The NSS calculates hidden employment in the country at approximately between 22 and 
26% annually (latest figures showed 22.9% hidden unemployment in 2005 and 24.8% in 
2006), but this rough estimate may be missing the trend that we observe here, especially 
at the seasonal level. Clearly, further research and more accurate data is necessary to 
validate this hypothesis. 
6.2 Fixed-Effects Regressions 
As noted above, the high likelihood of omitted variable bias in these regressions 
means that our results according to ordinary OLS means may be spurious, and thus a 
check on the robustness of results utilizing a fixed-effects specification (Equation 2) is 
necessary. The results of the fixed-effects regressions are shown in Tables 12 through 
18, and also reveal interesting effects of the Labor Code. 
In the first instance, observing the difference in total unemployment month over 
month (Table 12), the Labor Code continues to show slight negative significance, as in 
Table 3, although at a lower magnitude. This confirms that the Code is associated with a 
slight reduction in unemployment (in this case, unemployment changes over each 
month), something that comports with the EPL theory that there would be less 
turnover in the presence of stricter legislation. Table 13 also confirms the relative 
insignificance of the Labor Code to male unemployment, while Table 14 shows that, 
even with a fixed-effect specification, the Labor Code has resulted in lower female 
unemployment. One of the more interesting results of the fixed-effects regressions on 
the two gender subsets, however, is the effect of taxation: unlike in Tables 4 and 5, 
where higher tax wedges were strongly associated with higher unemployment across 
sexes, in Table 13 we can see this is the case with males but Table 14 shows that this is 
not the case for females. Indeed, the difference in the tax wedge shows a strong negative 
correlation for women, meaning that as the tax wedge incrementally increases, 
unemployment drops. This apparent paradox can also perhaps be explained by a 
movement from formal to informal employment, if workers formerly classified as 
“unemployed” remove themselves from the economically active population. 
Tables 15a and 15b repeat the OLS analysis on seasonal flows into and out of 
employment (as shown in Tables 6a and 6b) but with a fixed-effects specification. 
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Utilizing this specification shows even more striking results than in the ordinary 
regression, as the absolute effects of the Labor Code retain their positive sign and 
magnitude, confirming that overall flows have increased during the Labor Code years. 
And, also confirming the results of the OLS regression on the direction of employment 
flows, Table 15b shows that the Labor Code has indeed been significant in increasing 
flows out of employment; a negative and significant correlation exists between the 
existence of the Labor Code and the number of people who have left the employment 
rolls. While, as noted above, there may be underlying problems with the data series, 
these results at least show that the Labor Code may have increased turnover in one 
direction.  
Tables 16 and 17 focus once again on SESA’s vacancies as a proxy for labor 
market movement, and mirror the results from the OLS regression. Table 16 shows 
that, while utilizing fixed-effects, the significance of the Labor Code in increasing 
vacancies has strengthened somewhat, with the tax wedge’s dampening effect also 
remaining significant. In regards to the turnover of vacancies over the month (Table 17), 
the Labor Code retains it negative sign but not its significance, suggesting that other 
factors may be at play for how changes in intra-month employment flows play out. 
Finally, Table 18 shows the fixed-effects specification for seasonal unemployment 
flows, mirroring Table 9’s results (indeed, like in previous regressions, the flows 
indicator is itself already a differenced variable, making the original OLS specification 
partially-differenced). The Labor Code retains its negative significance, showing that the 
drop in unemployment rolls did actually slow as a result of the institution of the Code, 
while other variables remain insignificant. Indeed, the only new development in the 
fixed-effects regression for seasonal unemployment flows is that the trend variable has 
changed its sign and become significant, even when controlling for the effects of the 
change in legislation and change in taxation and output, showing that the passage of 
time corresponded with greater flows into and out of unemployment. The possible 
explanation for this change in direction is that the fixed effects specification did what it 
was designed to do, and removed an unobserved variable that was influencing both 
unemployment and time effects. 
7. Conclusions 
The effect of employment protection legislation is ambiguous in economics 
literature, but earlier studies have disaggregated the effects of EPL into a stock and a 
flow component, with the purpose of EPL legislation structured to dampen worker 
flows. Our analysis, utilizing both OLS and fixed-effects specifications, confirms these 
earlier studies done on EPL, showing that overall unemployment in Armenia appears to 
not have been affected but employment flows over seasons have changed significantly 
since the Labor Code was adopted, weighted heavily towards firing but not towards 
hiring of workers.  
As noted above, data in Armenia is a great limitation, and with time and the 
amassing of a greater time series, along with the sponsorship of more and better labor 
force surveys, more research can be undertaken on the effect of EPL. In particular, the 
persisting question of vanishing workers, and the extent of informality in Armenia after 
the institution of the Labor Code, is a large area that remains relatively unexplored 
(similarly, the resolution of data issues regarding the total extent of “employed” in 
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Armenia can come about through better quantification of the informal economy). The 
data limitations shown in official versus unofficial measurements of unemployment also 
remain problematic, and with better estimations of actual unemployment (including, 
again, the deep informal sector), the hypothesis presented in this paper can be better 
tested.  
Beyond these issues, this first attempt to quantify the labor market in Armenia has 
shown that in just a few short years, the Labor Code has had a significant impact on the 
flow of workers across seasons. However, the impact that the Labor Code has had on 
the labor market, especially in regards to turnover, is not necessarily the optimal 
outcome for Armenia, as unemployment continues to remain at very high levels. The 
relative underdeveloped state of the Armenian economy argues that perhaps greater 
turnover is to be welcomed, especially in the area of hiring, and the results obtained in 
this paper argue for a loosening of restrictions of some provisions of the Labor Code 
(as noted above, this analysis has not attempted to show the specific aspects of the 
Labor Code that have caused the most difficulty in worker flows). In a country with a 
tight labor market and fledgling labor market institutions, it would make sense to worry 
less, from a policy standpoint, about turnover, and more about broader job creation and 
encouraging businesses to hire. 
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Appendix: tables 
Table 1 - Theoretical Effects of Different Types of Labor Legislation 
Type of EPL 
Employment 
Effect 
Wage 
Effect 
Theoretically Dominant effect 
mandated overtime 
pay 
slightly negative 
slightly 
positive 
neutral 
occupational safety 
and health 
neutral negative wage 
maternity leave 
negative (for 
women) 
slightly 
negative 
employment 
restrictions on firing 
workers 
negative neutral employment 
vacation restrictions neutral neutral neutral 
collective bargaining negative positive employment 
Hiring restrictions 
(contract rules, etc.) 
negative neutral employment 
mandated severance 
pay 
neutral negative wage 
 
 
Table 2 – Changes in Flexibility due to the new Labor Code 
pre-Labor Code post-Labor Code 
  
2004-05 2006-07 
 Difficulty of hiring 
index   
17 33 
 Rigidity of hours 
index   
40 40 
 Difficulty of firing 
index   
50 20 
 Rigidity of 
employment index   
36 31 
 Firing costs 
(weeks)   
17 13 
Source: World Bank Doing Business Report, 2005 and 2007. Higher numbers for the index means more rigidity, while 
lower numbers indicate more labor market flexibility. 
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Table 3 - Sensitivity Analysis and Results of OLS Monthly Unemployment Analysis 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Unemployed 
 1 2 3 4 
Labor Code Dummy -53.20 -13.48 -7.28 -4.01 
  20.31 4.27 2.47 2.12 
Time  -0.63 0.47 -0.15 
   14.58 6.20 2.76 
Output Gap   -0.0001 0.00 
    3.58 8.07 
Tax Wedge    383.57 
     13.31 
C 138.33 156.16 167.01 44.07 
  71.65 92.04 57.43 4.68 
N 127 127 123 123 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.91 0.93 0.97 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Table 4 - Labor Code Effects on Male Unemployment 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Unemployed Males 
Labor Code Dummy -0.32 
  0.37 
Time -0.06 
  2.39 
Output Gap -0.0001 
  8.32 
Tax Wedge 187.32 
  14.27 
C -0.25 
  0.06 
N 123 
Adjusted R2 0.97 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 5 - Labor Code Effects on Female Unemployment 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Unemployed Females 
Labor Code Dummy -3.69 
  3.31 
Time -0.09 
  2.83 
Output Gap -0.0001 
  7.25 
Tax Wedge 196.25 
  11.52 
C 44.32 
  7.96 
N 123 
Adjusted R2 0.97 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Table 6a - Seasonal Employment and the Labor Code 
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Seasonal Employment Flows 
Labor Code Dummy 8.72 
  2.68 
Time 0.39 
  3.05 
Output Gap -0.002 
  4.43 
Tax Wedge -190.69 
  1.85 
C 83.81 
  2.52 
N 77 
Adjusted R2 0.24 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 6b – Effects of EPL on the Direction of Employment Flows 
Dependent Variable: Direction of Seasonal Employment Flows 
Labor Code Dummy -8.72 
  1.81 
Time 0.38 
  1.97 
Output Gap -0.002 
  0.32 
Tax Wedge 214.44 
  1.4 
C -75.13 
  1.52 
N 77 
Adjusted R2 0.12 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
 Figure 1 - Absolute Quarterly Employment Turnover in Armenia, 2004-2010 (in thousands) 
 
The chart shows the difference in seasonal employment over quarters: thus, the number for Q1 2005 shows the absolute value 
of the change between employment in Q1 2005 and Q1 2004. 
Source: NSS 
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Table 7 – Changes in Vacancies, Year on Year 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Vacancies Advertised, Year on Year 
(beginning of period) 
Labor Code Dummy 208.00 
  2.22 
Time 7.99 
  1.16 
Output Gap -0.01 
  2.39 
Tax Wedge -3009.55 
  1.02 
C 1391.21 
  1.53 
N 88 
Adjusted R2 0.14 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Table 8- Change in Monthly Vacancies, Beginning versus End of the Month 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Vacancies Advertised, Beginning and End of Month 
Labor Code Dummy -61.23 
  2.73 
Time 8.47 
  6.61 
Output Gap -0.26 
  3.76 
Tax Wedge 3548.24 
  4.67 
C -1119.88 
  4.24 
N 96 
Adjusted R2 0.61 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Figure 2 - Quarter over Quarter Unemployment in Armenia, 2000-2007 
 
Source: NSS 
 
Table 9 - Seasonal Unemployment Flows versus EPL 
Dependent Variable: Seasonal Unemployment Flows 
Labor Code Dummy -34.42 
  3.84 
Time -9.44 
  1.51 
Output Gap -0.0002 
  0.78 
Tax Wedge 965.09 
  0.73 
Average Benefits Received -0.0004 
  0.08 
C -361.90 
  0.85 
N 28 
Adjusted R2 0.51 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 10 - Determinants of Average Amount of Benefits Received in Armenia 
Dependent Variable: Average Amount of Benefits Received Monthly (in drams) 
Labor Code Dummy 1039.53 
  2.92 
Time 124.67 
  6.82 
Output Gap 0.02 
  0.30 
Tax Wedge 61298.32 
  7.41 
Average Monthly Wage 0.08 
  5.02 
Total Number of Unemployed 46.39 
  2.40 
C -28507.16 
  11.24 
N 123 
Adjusted R2 0.97 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Figure 3 - Total Employment and Total Unemployment in Armenia by quarter, 2004-2010 
 
Left-hand scale is total employment, right-hand is unemployment. A linear trendline has been fitted for total employment. 
Source: NSS 
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Table 11 - The Labor Code and Migration from Armenia 
Dependent Variable: Migration Statistics (Balance) 
Labor Code Dummy -403.13 
  0.10 
Time -200.17 
  1.58 
Output Gap 0.07 
  1.14 
Tax Wedge -196437.50 
  3.12 
C 57111.14 
  2.80 
N 122 
Adjusted R2 0.07 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Table 12 – Results of Fixed Effects Monthly Unemployment Analysis 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Unemployed Differenced 
Labor Code Dummy -1.01 
  2.19 
Time 0.03 
  4.17 
Output Gap -0.00001 
  0.46 
Tax Wedge -1.31 
  0.09 
C -1.92 
  7.00 
N 123 
Adjusted R2 0.18 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 13 – Differenced Labor Code Effects on Male Unemployment 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Unemployed Males 
  1 2 
Labor Code Dummy -0.27 -0.25 
  1.16 1.10 
Time 0.01 0.01 
  3.03 2.65 
Output Gap -0.0001 -0.0001 
  1.40 1.65 
Tax Wedge 20.90 20.72 
  2.71 2.70 
Number of People Receiving Benefits  0.07 
   1.52 
C -0.75 -0.69 
  5.47 4.79 
N 122 122 
Adjusted R2 0.21 0.22 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 14 – Differenced Labor Code Effects on Female Unemployment 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Unemployed Females 
  1 2 
Labor Code Dummy -0.74 -0.71 
  2.42 2.36 
Time 0.02 0.02 
  4.00 3.49 
Output Gap 0.0001 -0.0001 
  0.37 0.02 
Tax Wedge -22.21 -22.56 
  2.18 2.25 
Number of People Receiving Benefits  0.13 
   2.23 
C -1.17 -1.04 
  6.41 5.54 
N 122 122 
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.18 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 15a - Seasonal Employment and EPL, Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Absolute Value of Seasonal Employment Flows 
Labor Code Dummy 8.63 
  2.91 
Time -0.17 
  2.69 
Output Gap -0.001 
  2.85 
Tax Wedge 171.86 
  1.25 
C 14.75 
  5.29 
N 77 
Adjusted R2 0.15 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Table 15b – Direction of Employment Flows, Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Direction of Seasonal Employment Flows 
Labor Code Dummy -11.75 
  2.91 
Time 0.2 
  2.26 
Output Gap -0.0006 
  2.46 
Tax Wedge 159.7 
  0.85 
C -6.31 
  1.66 
N 77 
Adjusted R2 0.16 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 EJCE, vol.7, n.2 (2010) 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
444 
Table 16 – Changes in Vacancies, Year on Year, Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Vacancies Advertised, Year on Year 
(beginning of period) 
Labor Code Dummy 246.12 
  2.50 
Time -4.74 
  2.35 
Output Gap 0.01 
  1.41 
Tax Wedge 655.69 
  0.16 
C 173.05 
  2.24 
N 88.00 
Adjusted R2 0.04 
 Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
Table 17- Change in Monthly Vacancies, Beginning versus End of the Month, Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Difference in Vacancies Advertised, Beginning and End of 
Month 
Labor Code Dummy -27.62 
  1.19 
Time 2.36 
  5.26 
Output Gap 0.75 
  1.52 
Tax Wedge -1195.77 
  0.94 
C 114.94 
  7.79 
N 95 
Adjusted R2 0.51 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
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Table 18 - Seasonal Unemployment Flows, Fixed-Effects 
Dependent Variable: Seasonal Unemployment Flows 
Labor Code Dummy -36.68 
  3.26 
Time 2.98 
  3.61 
Output Gap 0.0001 
  0.12 
Tax Wedge 366.45 
  0.90 
Average Benefits Received 0.0002 
  0.77 
C -74.44 
  5.33 
N 28 
Adjusted R2 0.52 
Note:  Absolute value of t-statistics under coefficients 
 
